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### Off

### No Nuclear Weapons T 1NC

#### Hostilities must include a ground presence- history should be the guide for definitions- dictionaries suck

Chesney 2011 [Robert Chesney is the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution June 28, 2011 “An Overview of Harold Koh’s Testimony on the WPR at Today’s SFRC Hearing” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/an-overview-of-harold-kohs-testimony-on-the-wpr-at-todays-sfrc-hearing/]

The word “hostilities,” which is the trigger for the 60-day clock, is an “ambiguous term of art” that was not defined in the WPR, and the legislative history on the point is indeterminate. The word is not to be construed just by reference to dictionaries, but in no small part through historical practice.¶ Four limitations combine to make the “Libya Mission” something other than hostilities in the WPR sense:¶ 1) The limited nature of the mission: this is a UNSC-approved mission for limited goals, led by NATO, with widespread international support.¶ 2) Exposure of our armed forces is limited: since moving to the NATO support role, no casualties or serious risk of them¶ 3) Risk of escalation is limited: in contrast to, say, Desert Shield/Storm. No ground presence, no likelihood of expanding geographic scope.¶ 4) Using only limited military means, short of the “full military engagement” with which the WPR is concerned. Yes there are kinetic operations still occuring, but they are a far cry from, say, U.S. air operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. 90% of kinetic strikes are by other countries (meaning 10% are by U.S. armed forces).

#### Troops are the key standard- excludes nuclear weapons

Ambinder 2011 [Marc Ambinder June 17, 2011 “White House Acknowledges Pentagon's Lawyer Disagreed About War Powers” http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/white-house-acknowledges-pentagon-s-lawyer-disagreed-about-war-powers-20110617]

The Times reported that President Obama, his chief lawyer, Robert Bauer, and the State Department legal adviser, Harold Koh, thought that “hostilities” did not apply to the conflict. This is because no entity is firing at U.S. troops, troops are not in any danger, and the U.S. is simply complying with a United Nations resolution. If the action in Libya did trigger the War Powers Act, Obama would have been required to seek permission from Congress a month ago. He has not. The U.S. provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, ammunition and bombs, as well as targeting and planning for NATO’s campaign against the Libyan regime. The U.S. does not fly its pilots over the country, though it does use drones to fire missiles, and it has not tasked ground troops for the mission.¶ Critics say that the administration's position would allow it to drop a bunker-busting bomb or launch a nuclear weapon against a regime, in a pre-emptive strike, and not technically be at "war." The administration clearly contemplated a much shorter duration of action when it first began airstrikes in February.

This interp is key to limits- definitional precision is not going to provide it on this topic so it must be maintained by the debaters- broad definitions of hostilities allow almost infinite affs about introduction of weapons platforms- targeted killing section of the topic was meant to deal with drones not this one

### Off

#### Nuclear primacy now

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

Since 2006, we have discussed these issues with many nuclear analysts, ¶ US government officials, and military officers involved with the nuclear ¶ mission. Almost everything we learned reinforced our views about the counterforce revolution and suggests our earlier work understated the ¶ leap in US counterforce capabilities—with one exception. We previously ¶ argued that US “nuclear primacy”—the ability to use nuclear weapons ¶ to destroy the strategic forces of any other country—appeared to be an ¶ intentional goal of US policymakers. We noted that even as the United ¶ States greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal, it retained, and in some cases ¶ improved, those nuclear forces that were ideally suited to the counterforce mission. Based on what we have subsequently learned, we would ¶ recast and sharpen this part of our argument to contend that the United ¶ States is intentionally pursuing “strategic primacy”—meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other ¶ WMD)—but that US nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that ¶ effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces—that ¶ is, achieve strategic primacy—spans nearly every realm of warfare: for ¶ example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence surveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition ¶ to nuclear strike capabilities.

#### First use is key to coercive function of nuclear weapons

Thayer 2012 [Bradley A. Thayer served as a consultant to the Department of Defense and is professor of political science at Baylor University. February 17, 2012 Washington Times “Preserving our nuclear deterrence” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/17/preserving-our-nuclear-deterrence/]

Nuclear weapons aid Uncle Sam’s ability to coerce opponents as well for three reasons. First, in a crisis situation, nuclear weapons help persuade a challenger not to escalate to a higher level of violence or move up a rung on the escalation ladder. Second, although laden with risks, they also provide the possibility of attacking first to limit the damage the United States or its allies would receive. Whether the U.S. would do so is another matter. But possessing the capability provides the nation with coercive capabilities in crisis situations or war. Third, nuclear weapons give the United States the ability to threaten nuclear first-use to stop a conventional attack or limited nuclear attack and to signal the risk of escalating violence to a higher level.

#### Inevitable conventional conflicts are coming with nuclear armed adversaries- nuclear primacy is key to contain those conflicts

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

A second set of arguments stems from the problem of nuclear escalation and the future of the US nuclear arsenal. Our main claim is that deterring nuclear conflict will be much more difficult in the coming decades ¶ than many analysts realize. As nuclear weapons proliferate, it becomes ¶ increasingly likely that the United States will find itself in conventional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Those adversaries understand ¶ the consequences of losing a war to the United States—prison or death ¶ typically awaits enemy leaders.¶ 7¶ Coercive nuclear escalation as a means ¶ of creating stalemate and remaining in power is one of the only trump ¶ cards available to countries fighting the United States.¶ Some analysts might scoff at the notion that a rational leader would ¶ use nuclear weapons against a superpower like the United States. But ¶ that retort conflates the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic ¶ of war, and it ignores history. During peacetime, almost any course of ¶ action is better than starting a nuclear war against a superpower. But ¶ during war—when that superpower’s planes are bombing command and ¶ leadership sites, and when its tanks are seizing territory—the greatest ¶ danger may be to refrain from escalation and let the war run its course. ¶ Leaders of weaker states—those unlikely to prevail on the conventional ¶ battlefield—face life-and-death pressures to compel a stalemate. And ¶ nuclear weapons provide a better means of coercive escalation than ¶ virtually any other.¶ The notion of countries escalating conflict to avoid conventional defeat may sound far-fetched, but it is well grounded in history. When ¶ nuclear-armed states face overwhelming conventional threats—or worry ¶ about the possibility of catastrophic conventional defeat—they often ¶ adopt coercive escalatory doctrines to deter war or stalemate a conflict ¶ that erupts. Pakistan openly intends to use nuclear weapons to counter ¶ an overwhelming conventional Indian invasion. Russia claims it needs ¶ theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO’s conventional advantages. ¶ Israel expects to win its conventional wars but retains the capability for ¶ nuclear escalation to prevent conquest in case its conventional forces ¶ suffer a catastrophic defeat. ¶ The discussion of coercive nuclear escalation should sound familiar ¶ to Western analysts, as it was NATO’s strategy for three decades. From ¶ the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War, NATO planned to deter ¶ war, and stalemate it if necessary, through coercive nuclear escalation. ¶ NATO understood that—by the mid 1960s—it could no longer win a ¶ nuclear war against the Soviet Union, but it still based its national security ¶ strategy on coercive escalation because it believed Warsaw Pact conventional forces were overwhelming.¶ In short, the escalatory dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist ¶ today—and they are just as powerful. States still face the same critical ¶ national security problem they faced during the Cold War and throughout history: namely, how to prevent stronger countries from conquering them. The high-stakes poker game of international politics has not ¶ ended; the players and the cards dealt have merely changed. Those who ¶ were weak during the Cold War are now strong, and another set of ¶ militarily “weak” countries—such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and ¶ even China and Russia—now clutch or seek nuclear weapons to defend ¶ themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did.¶ What can the United States do to mitigate the problem of escalation? ¶ Ideally, it should avoid wars against nuclear-armed enemies. But that ¶ option may not be possible given current US foreign policy and alliances. War may erupt on the Korean Peninsula, ensnaring the United ¶ States in a battle against a desperate nuclear-armed foe. In the future, ¶ Washington may fight a nuclear-armed Iran over sea lanes in the Persian ¶ Gulf. And the United States could someday be dragged into war by a ¶ clash between Chinese and Japanese naval forces near disputed islands. ¶ Alternatively, the United States could seek to develop conventional ¶ war plans designed to wage limited war without triggering enemy escalation. Development of alternative plans is sensible, but history shows ¶ that wars are difficult to contain, and modern conventional warfare is ¶ inherently escalatory. ¶ A third option to mitigate these dangers is to retain, and improve, ¶ US nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. Fielding powerful ¶ counterforce weapons may help deter adversary escalation during war—¶ by convincing enemy leaders to choose a “golden parachute” rather than ¶ escalation—and would give US leaders better response options if deterrence failed. In particular, the United States should retain and develop ¶ nuclear weapons that bring together three key characteristics of counterforce: high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery.¶ To be clear, sharpening US counterforce capabilities is not a “solution” ¶ to the problem of adversary nuclear weapons. Although, ceteris paribus, ¶ it would be better to have excellent counterforce capabilities than to lack ¶ them, given enough time and motivation, many countries could greatly ¶ increase the survivability of their forces. But given the plausible prospect ¶ that the United States will find itself waging war against nuclear-armed ¶ states, and given the powerful incentives of US adversaries to brandish ¶ or use nuclear weapons, it would be reckless to proceed without a full ¶ suite of modern nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities.

### Off

#### Obama’s strength will allow a debt deal without complicated battle and additional spending cuts

JONATHAN ALLEN | 9/19/13 6:42 PM EDT Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/republicans-budget-obama-97093.html#ixzz2fRhWaU12

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills. ”It would not be good for the middle class of this country or for our general economy to see a lapse in the funding of essential government operations,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said Thursday. Republican leaders say it’s Obama who is out of touch. “Americans don’t support Obamacare, and they don’t support increasing the debt limit without any measures to reduce the deficit itself,” said Brendan Buck, spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner. “The president has put himself in the position of defending two things that put him on the wrong side of public opinion.” Democrats say their Syria fight looked like Yalta compared to the GOP’s “civil war” over Obamacare, the continuing resolution and the debt limit. Still, Obama spent the first weeks of September making the case for a military strike that was unpopular not just with the public but with his own Democratic allies in Congress. At worst, it was a demonstration that he has lost influence on Capitol Hill and within his own party. At best, it was a major message distraction. Carney alluded to the lost Syria weeks on Monday when he said “time is short” for the president to make his case before the deadline for extending government funding. Now, the White House has seemingly pushed its message machine back on track — and it’s getting an extra boost from congressional Democrats who want to take the fight to the GOP. Some House Democrats privately express the view — to reporters and to the White House — that it might be better to let the government shut down rather than extend sequester-level spending for a few months. Such a destabilizing event could do enough damage to the GOP brand to shatter Republicans’ lock on a House majority in next year’s election, they hope, without seriously harming the economy. The White House would clearly prefer to simply keep the government funded and raise the debt ceiling without a crisis — after all, Obama risks collateral damage even if Republicans are hurt by a shutdown.“It is not our policy and not our view that a shutdown would be anything but bad,” Carney said.

Still, aides to the president and Boehner have said there’s no back-channeling going on between the two leaders, and White House officials say that while they expect Obama to talk with congressional leaders soon, there’s nothing on the schedule at the moment.

There’s also reason to think that the GOP establishment is afraid the brinksmen among House Democrats are right about who will win the political aftermath of a government shutdown or a default. Republican strategists outside the crowded conservative corners of the House Republican Conference are reacting along a spectrum that ranges from scratching their heads to tearing their hair out. Nicolle Wallace, a former communications aide to President George W. Bush, had told MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” on Wednesday that Obama erred by giving a partisan speech on the budget fights on the heels of a massacre in Washington. “It really speaks to me about a White House with no more controls. There are no internal controls anymore. There’s no process by which that staff can get to him and make something stop,” she said. “Once a train has been pushed out of the station, no matter how ill-advised its course, nothing and no one can stop it.” By Thursday, the transportation metaphors cut in the other direction. “We are going to let our party run into moving traffic against a red light,” she said on the same program. “It’s idiotic.” The Wall Street Journal editorial page and Karl Rove, Bush’s chief strategist, have also taken fellow Republicans to task in recent days for letting Obama get the upper hand with their obsessive — and sure to fail — effort to kill Obamacare at any potential political cost. There are potential pitfalls for Democrats, too. They risk getting caught up in a blame game if there’s a shutdown and they vote against a GOP-written bill that would extend government funding while blocking Obamacare funds. Even without the Obamacare provision — which could, conceivably, be stripped out by the Senate — many of them don’t want to lock in current spending levels because they say the sequestration deal struck at the end of a similar showdown in August 2011 has robbed their communities of needed funding. That makes it hard to swallow a so-called clean extension of government funding for a few months. Democratic Rep. Gerry Connolly, who represents thousands of government workers and contractors in northern Virginia, is against both a shutdown and the maintenance of current spending levels. He would vote for a clean CR to keep the government funded rather than letting it shut down but would prefer to see the president strike a deal that increases funding for some priorities. In any event, he said, he won’t vote for legislation that defunds Obamacare — like the version of the CR that the House is set to vote on Friday. But Connolly and other Democrats seem willing to follow Obama, who is vowing not to cut Obamacare or negotiate over whether to raise the debt limit next month, all without getting into the details of a possible deal. At least for now. “He has not really given much away,” Connolly said. “I think his Sphinx-like position with respect to the Republicans makes it harder for them to exact unacceptable concessions, and therefore it’s probably a wise posture at this time.”

#### NFU burns political capital, disrupting Obama’s agenda

Morton H. Halperin worked on nuclear issues in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administrations in the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the State Department. He is a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and Senior Advisor to the Open Society Institute. Survival | vol. 51 no. 5 | October–November 2009 Promises and Priorities | pp. 17–46

Obama has stated that he believes it is in the American interest to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Indeed, his commitment to seek a world free of nuclear weapons carries the clear implication that we can meet all of our security challenges, short of nuclear threats, without reliance on nuclear weapons. However, there are other proposals to pursue this objective which would be as effective as a declaratory no-first-use policy and which might produce less controversy. In his Prague speech, in addition to announcing support for the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, Obama committed himself in the short run to four other measures which have long been debated and which advance the same objectives as the no-first-use proposal. These are: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, immediately and aggressively pursuing US ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and starting negotiations on a verifiable end to the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This ambitious agenda will require all the attention and political capital the president can reasonably devote to this issue. Under the circumstances, no first use can and should be put off for another day. Seeking three treaties on nuclear arms control in his first term will not be easy. The Senate looks ready to ratify the new START and the proposal for a ban on fissile-material production for weapons purposes has not engendered much opposition as of yet. The CTBT, however, is another story. Republican orthodoxy on nuclear weapons emphasises unequivocal support for ballistic- missile defence and virulent opposition to no first use and the test ban. The opposition to both stems from the same source. Opponents of the treaty seek new nuclear weapons with new capabilities for a variety of pre-emptive and preventive purposes. They worry about the Russian development of new nuclear weapons and argue that the Kremlin has a different view of what is prohibited under the treaty and will, in any case, cheat. They doubt that US ratification of the CTBT will help prevent proliferation. Winning the CTBT debate and ultimately gaining the 67 votes in the Senate necessary to permit US ratification of the treaty is far from assured, but it is possible. The president is committed to the CTBT and not yet to no first use. In any case, I would argue that ratification of the CTBT and a vigorous effort to secure the other ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into force is the more important, and promising, effort to stigmatise nuclear weapons.

#### Failure to quickly raise the debt ceiling ensures collapse of the global economy, U.S. economic leadership, and free trade

Davidson 9/10

Adam, co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money,” a podcast and blog, “Our Debt to Society”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, MCR

**If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted** again this fall, some **serious financial decisions will have to be made**. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually **the big-ticket items**, like **Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut**. At some point, **the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter** what’s known as **sovereign default**, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). **In the case of the U**nited **S**tates, though, **it won’t be** an **isolated** national crisis. **If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency**, then **the global financial system will** very likely **enter a new era in which there is much less trade and** much less **economic growth. It would be**, by most accounts, **the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history**.¶ **Nearly everyone** involved **predicts** that **someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans** (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) **appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised** — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, **the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds**. **The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing** — **which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse** far worse **than anything we’ve seen in the past several years**.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that **while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable**. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, **the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy**.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, **the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters**. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, **the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier**.

#### Econ collapse = extinction

Kemp 10 Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

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#### Text: The U.S. Supreme Court should rule that presidential first use of nuclear weapons without Congressional approval is unconstitutional.

#### Courts solve Congress fails

**Hemesath, 2000** (Paul A. Hemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown University Law Center, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown Law Journal, August, lexis)

As noted, the judiciary has remained chary of interfering in struggles between the President and Congress, perhaps for good reason. 193 However, as long as the Supreme Court chooses to **avoid** a merit-based decision and leave the definitive jurisdictional questions to the lower courts, the nature of the disagreement will remain uniquely uncertain and susceptible to presidential fait accompli lacking [\*2501] in legitimacy and considered constitutional judgment. The enactment of a strong, unambiguous statute combined with a propitious set of facts would allow the question to arrive at the Supreme Court for a decision on its merits, or at least an unambiguous jurisdictional determination upon which the Congress and the President may come to depend as to their actual, constitutional powers. A decision before the Supreme Court would provide acceptable clarity in any of the three scenarios that may be imagined. In the case that the Supreme Court is able to put aside standing, ripeness, and political question doctrines as jurisdictional barriers, a settled meaning of the war powers would finally come to light. Whether the Court decides for the supremacy of the Executive or Congress, the harm associated with war powers uncertainty would diminish with the certitude of the decision. Assuming a decision that favors the Executive, Congress would be put on notice that future judicial challenges regarding the war powers would prove fruitless, thus negating future harmful constitutional challenges in the throes of crisis. Although such a decision risks the harms associated with a one-person army, 194 it would allow Congress to prepare for this constitutional reality by carefully structuring appropriations mechanisms or more credibly threatening impeachment in times of controversial military action. Assuming that the Supreme Court holds that the President must respect the war powers authority of Congress, the harmful effects of uncertainty would be diminished as well. In this case, both the President and the Congress would recognize that a legislative lawsuit based on a congressional majority adverse to the President's actions is no longer a wildcard subject to the formerly treacherous and unpredictable procedural hurdles thrown up by lower courts. But most importantly, the validity of the war powers legislation itself, previously slandered for its ineffectiveness and accused of being unconstitutional, 195 would be confirmed in the eyes of both the legislature and the Executive, thereby allowing each branch to plan accordingly. 196 [\*2502] Finally, even if the Court were to reject the case on pure justiciability grounds, as did the D.C. Circuit in Campbell, its practical effect would also serve to dispel the evils of uncertainty. By rejecting a case based on ideal facts--for example, a war powers controversy based on executive rejection of a congressional majority vote against further military action subject to an unequivocal War Powers Act--the Supreme Court would send a clear message that the courts will not serve as surrogates for political action. The practical effect of such a decision would obviously favor the Executive because the President controls the immediate mechanisms for military action. 197 However, with the firm knowledge that the courts will not assist a congressional recapture of the war powers, a disillusioned Congress would be enabled to take steps to enhance its currently ineffective political tools--complex appropriations mechanisms and direct threats of impeachment. C. BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE The initial onus is thus on Congress to overcome three distinct challenges to bringing the war powers question to the Supreme Court in a unified and unequivocal manner. First, and above all, the Congress must develop a consensus that the hazards of an uncertain nuclear authority and the dangers of a one-person army are too great to be ignored. 198 Both policy and constitutional justifications strongly gird the acceptance of this view, but it is up to a fickle and politically charged Congress to generate the consensus needed to establish an unequivocal case for the Court's judgement. Second, based on this consensus, the Congress must enact a new War Powers Act, perhaps of the style suggested by Professor Ely, with the goal of drafting a law that is unambiguous and not subject to subtle points of misinterpretation. Such a law would grant the Congress an unequivocal basis for opposing unilateral presidential military action that would not be vulnerable to definitional objections or timing ambiguities. 199 Explicit exceptions should be made, however, as was the intention of the Framers, for situations that require the Executive to repel sudden attacks. 200 Third, not relying solely on the force of its own words, the Congress must utilize its next opportunity to bring suit against the President based on a violation of the new Act, whether it agrees politically with the violation or not. In other words, the Congress must put aside its political judgement to claim its constitutional birthright in order to approve nuclear actions, or any other [\*2503] warlike actions, in the future. 201 The necessity for congressional action sooner rather than later is based on the arguments advanced in Part IV--that a nuclear decision made in the throes of constitutional controversy is bound to be perceived as illegitimate. 202 Thus, the opportunity to establish a declarative victory, when the stakes are much lower, must be exploited to avoid the consequences of an extemporaneous solution in a nuclear context. At the point when the Congress musters the political will to create a viable statute and assemble a clear majority opposing executive military action, the matter will arrive before the courts to be decided either on its merits--an act never consummated by the Supreme Court in regard to modern war powers--or upon jurisdictional issues. As noted above, such a decision would resolve war powers uncertainty by providing a reliable and final interpretation of the war powers or the procedures necessary to enforce them. It is only through the aforementioned procedure that this complex issue would ever arrive at a concrete and legitimate resolution. Without the action of a unified Congress, and then the judgement of an unequivocal court, the power to make nuclear war will remain uncertain yet perversely concentrated. CONCLUSION The resolution of nuclear authority is imperative to the goal of living in a secure and constitutional world. Without a clear conception of who and under what circumstances leaders may legally launch a nuclear weapon, severe consequences stemming from divided leadership and constitutional uncertainty are **sure to follow**. The solution to this vexing problem--confounded by the vicissitudes of the post-Cold War era, the temptation of powerful technology, and the forces of institutional power struggles--ultimately **lies in the courts**, but before legal process may be brought to bear, congressional leadership must coalesce in the interest of resolution. Until then, the United States will face an ominous uncertainty. Who actually holds the power to launch a nuclear weapon offensively will remain shrouded in an extra-judicial constitutional debate to be ultimately decided only in the throes of crisis. To avoid such an extemporaneous solution is to advance the responsible custody of nuclear weapons.

### Prolif Adv

#### NPT causes opaque proliferation and nuclear war- ensures that the US leadership falls on deaf ears

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce¶ such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for¶ aspiring nuclear weapons states.¶ 4¶ Opaque proliferation is destabilising to¶ regional security. It breeds miscalculation\*/both overestimation of a state’s¶ nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)\*/that can force neighbouring states into¶ potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is¶ the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop¶ weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less¶ attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the¶ risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot¶ be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be¶ practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or¶ incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a¶ conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also¶ appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments¶ mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).¶ And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine¶ place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons,¶ states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe¶ technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of¶ assistance (Pregenzer 2003).

#### Prolif is inevitable due to security concerns- US prolif leadership only makes it worse- no risk of break- out prolif

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The drivers of proliferation among several of Asia’s emerging great powers¶ combine both mounting demand-side incentives and crumbling supply-side¶ controls. Neither of these can adequately be addressed by the NPT in its current¶ state. The major demand-side incentives are greater strategic uncertainty among¶ regional powers and a rising thirst for international prestige. At the global level,¶ the actions and statements of the United States, which currently combines a¶ belief in its unassailable power with a post-11 September 2001 conviction of its¶ unrivalled vulnerability, have increased the strategic uncertainties of many¶ states. The current US preoccupation with terrorism and non-proliferation and¶ recent high-visibility demonstrations of US air power have enhanced the¶ credibility of Washington’s threats of coercion against ‘rogue states’. As the¶ United States’ inhibitions against the use of force have fallen, the attractiveness¶ of nuclear weapons\*/the ultimate insurance policy\*/have risen.¶ In Asia, a newly intense pattern of competition and collusion among the¶ current and emerging great powers has further increased the attractiveness of¶ nuclear weapons. China, Japan, India, Russia and Iran have reacted to a range¶ of recent changes\*/rising prosperity, regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq,¶ patterns of alignment and basing during the ‘war on terror’, uncertainties over¶ energy security\*/to create a shifting pattern of alignments and tensions that are¶ yet to settle into a stable and predictable template. In the meantime, this new¶ great power manoeuvring has begun to link up previously separate security¶ dyads and complexes, as combinations of powers jostle for position in¶ Northeast, Southeast, Central, South and Western Asia. This is a fluid and¶ potentially dangerous power dynamic, as Asia’s powers are yet to settle among¶ themselves issues of status, spheres of influence, regional norms of behaviour,¶ patterns of alignment and enmity and tacit conditions governing the use of¶ force. Meanwhile, the threat perceptions of many middle and smaller powers¶ have been raised. As regional rivalries drive various containment and countercontainment strategies (see Paul 2003), and increased strategic uncertainty¶ raises states’ security concerns, the demand-side pressures for nuclear weapons¶ will continue to mount.¶ The other major demand-side driver of proliferation is the growing thirst for¶ status among Asia’s emerging great powers. Rising prosperity and growing¶ nationalism has fed a renewed interest in gaining symbols of international¶ prestige and influence. The campaign of states such as Japan, India, Indonesia¶ and Brazil for permanent seats on the UN Security Council is one manifestation¶ of the new hunger for prestige. Membership of the ‘nuclear club’ has long been¶ recognised as another tacit symbol of great power status. Possession of nuclear¶ weapons is one indicator of membership in the great power ‘club’. The ability to¶ design and manufacture nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles is thought to¶ signal high levels of technological competence, a particularly important status¶ symbol for developing countries (Navais 1990: 9/13).¶ The NPT’s inability either to prevent the spread of nuclear components,¶ materials and technology, or to secure the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear¶ weapons states (as discussed below), only adds to these demand-side pressures.¶ In developing nuclear weapons, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and¶ probably Iran have demonstrated that neither the NPT nor any other¶ international regime provides them with an adequate security guarantee against¶ either nuclear or conventional coercion. To the contrary, by confining the¶ possession of nuclear weapons to some states and not others, the NPT has¶ raised the attractiveness of nuclear weapons for those states not covered by the¶ nuclear weapons states’ guarantees of extended deterrence.¶ These demand-side pressures suggest that the incentives of a small number of¶ states to acquire nuclear weapons will endure over time. Each new nuclear¶ weapons state will give rise to proliferation incentives among a limited number¶ of neighbours and rivals, thereby maintaining a fairly consistent level of¶ proliferation pressure over time. As I discuss below, because the vast majority of¶ states choose to eschew nuclear weapons, because their sense of insecurity is¶ insufficient to justify the costs of possessing nuclear weapons, the risks of a¶ major nuclear ‘break out’ are low. It is the conditions of proliferation, rather¶ than its occurrence, that a new regime should try to regulate.

#### Prolif leadership is ineffective- successes have been overstated

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of¶ status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation¶ was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only¶ magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession¶ of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and¶ South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire¶ nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were¶ building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian¶ Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/not¶ chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The¶ international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring¶ nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the¶ non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s¶ highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and¶ short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of¶ the NPT regime, perhaps terminally.

#### No cascade of proliferation – its all alarmist rhetoric

Muthia Alagappa, pub. date: 2008, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia,” accesed: 1-6-09, p. 521-2, Google Books

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country’s security concerns about the U ntied States and Tehran’s regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in it’s political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country’s decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Through appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

#### Robust statistical studies prove prolif decreases war and escalation

Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, pub. date: 2007, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle Beardsley, Asst. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory Univ., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” accessed: 12-18-09, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139

The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists’ argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot speak to other proliferation risks

### China Adv

#### No modernization – consensus.

**Hansell and Perfilyev 2009** (Cristina Hansell, Director, Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and Nikita Perfilyev is a Fulbright fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2009, “Strategic Relations between the United States, Russia, and China and the Possibility of Cooperation on Disarmament,” cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf)

China’s official policy is that it maintains nuclear weapons only because other nations threaten it with nuclear weapons; Beijing has long called for complete global disarmament.10 However, China also appears to view its nuclear forces as important to its standing as a great power. The Chinese maintain a far smaller nuclear arsenal than either the United States or Russia, with fewer than 100 operational warheads, which accords with a doctrine of “minimal deterrence” or “minimum means of reprisal.”11 This doctrine is based on the belief that deterrence does not require the level of force traditionally assumed necessary under U.S. and Russian doctrines, and it is mated with a no-first-use nuclear doctrine that rejects initiating a nuclear exchange under any circumstances. Chinese forces have been kept off the “hair-trigger alert” of U.S. and Russian forces—**even in crisis**.12 As explained further by Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Sha Zukang in 2000, “as long as [a medium or small nuclear country] still possess[es] the capability of launching the second nuclear strike to inflict unbearable losses” on an attacker, a strategic balance can be achieved even with a country possessing more and better nuclear weapons.13 Yet China’s policy makers note that their nuclear policy differs even from that of the United Kingdom and France, “in terms of what nuclear weapons deter against, the amount of nuclear weapons required for a retaliatory strike that is sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy, and other aspects.”14 There has been much **speculation** by foreign experts that China might alter its nuclear doctrine as its nuclear capabilities increase—that its doctrine has been borne of necessity. Recent advances in ballistic missile submarines,15it is suggested, would give China the capability to back up a doctrine more similar to that of the United States or Russia. When one examines the available Chinese literature on the subject, however, it does **not** appear that **any such change is imminent**. To deter an attack, however, Chinese planners recognize that a potential opponent must believe that China has nuclear weapons that would survive a first strike and that Beijing is willing to launch a counterstrike. A few years ago, this led some Chinese experts to argue for “limited deterrence” (youxian weishe), which would require new operational capabilities and putting Chinese forces on a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack status.16( In the United States, some experts have put forward a similar argument to suggest that “usable” low-yield nuclear weapons are needed to make deterrence credible.) However, Beijing’s military leaders appear to have decided that deploying mobile missiles and a sea-based deterrent is sufficient to ensure the credibility of China’s deterrent. Most China analysts **do not expect** Beijing to abandon minimum deterrence at this point in time.

#### No modernization – exaggeration and technological expiration outpacing modernization.

**NRDC, 2006** (Targeted News Service, The Natural Resources Defense Council issued the following news release, “Report Finds that Pentagon Exaggerating China’s Nuclear Capability to Justify Buying New Generation of U.S. weapons” November 30, lexis)

The U.S. military, intelligence agencies, and conservative think tanks and news organizations are **exaggerating** China's nuclear weapons capability to justify developing a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons, according to a report issued today by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Likewise, the report found that the Chinese have been citing U.S. weapons upgrades as a rationale for modernizing theirs, locking the two nations in a dangerous action-and-reaction competition reminiscent of the Cold War. "The Pentagon has been sounding the alarm about China's nuclear intentions for a long time, but our analysis shows that they are overstating the threat," said Robert S. Norris, an NRDC nuclear analyst and co-author of the report. "Now that the Soviet Union is gone, the military needs a new threat to justify buying new missiles, destroyers, submarines and fighter planes. So they're hyping China." Based on unclassified and declassified U.S. government documents as well as commercial satellite images of Chinese installations, the 250-page report, "Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning," provides a detailed overview of China's nuclear forces and its plans to upgrade them. It also describes two nuclear strike scenarios that calculate the casualties that each side would suffer. (For the report, go to docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/nuc\_06113001a.pdf. For high-resolution Google Earth satellite images of dozens of nuclear weapons-related and other military sites in China, as well as the report's nuclear strike simulations, go to www.nrdc.org/media/docs/061130.kmz.) The report's main finding is that the Pentagon and others routinely highlight specific incidents out of context that inaccurately portray a looming Chinese threat. Specifically, the report demonstrates they have been embellishing China's submarine and long-range missile capabilities. For the last two years, the Pentagon's annual report on Chinese military developments cited the intrusion of a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine into Japanese territorial waters in 2004 as emblematic of how China's military is trying to expand its reach deep into the Pacific. What the DOD reports did not mention, the FAS/NRDC report reveals, is Chinese submarine patrols have **dropped** from a peak of six in 2000 to **zero** in 2005. Dramatic news coverage earlier this month of a Chinese submarine surfacing in the vicinity of the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group near Okinawa failed to mention that this was the first reported Chinese submarine patrol in nearly two years. In addition, the report found that China's sole submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles, which was built in 1981, has never gone on an extended deterrent patrol with nuclear missiles. In fact, the submarine has never been fully operational. Similarly, U.S. intelligence agencies warn that the Chinese will be able to target 75 to 100 nuclear warheads at the continental **U**nited **S**tates by 2015. But that prediction assumes China will be able to deploy 40 to 55 new DF-31A missiles before 2015, in addition to two other shorter-range missiles. Given that the Chinese have yet to conduct test flights of the DF-31A, the report concluded that that assumption is **highly questionable**. The Pentagon also has made much out of the fact that China's next-generation missiles will be mobile. But the majority of China's ballistic missile force always has been mobile, the report points out, and the U.S. military has targeted it as a routine matter since the 1980s. In fact, improved U.S. targeting of Chinese missiles has played a significant role in prompting China to develop new long-range missiles, according to U.S. intelligence agencies. The report concludes that the United States will be easily able to maintain its overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Chinese for decades. But the report also points out the China needs relatively few warheads to adequately deter the United States. A hypothetical Chinese attack with its 20 nuclear long-range ballistic missiles on 20 U.S. cities would result in as many as 40 million casualties, the report estimates, and blanket large portions of the United States and Canada with radioactive fallout. Likewise, the United States needs relatively few warheads to deter China. A limited and highly accurate U.S. nuclear attack on China's 20 long-range ballistic missile silos would result in as many as 11 million casualties and scatter radioactive fallout across three Chinese provinces, according to a simulation described in the report. The report does confirm that China - like all of the declared nuclear powers - is indeed updating its forces. This effort, however, has been **moving slowly** and is, to a considerable extent, a reaction to U.S. nuclear deployments and military policies. "Unlike the United States or Russia, the Chinese have taken **extraordinarily long periods of time** to field new weapons systems," said Hans Kristensen, project director at the Federation of American Scientists and lead author of the report. "And in many cases, their weapons have been **obsolete** by the time they were finally deployed. But the Chinese still need to be more open about their plans, or they will continue to feed the perception among U.S. military officials that they pose a significant threat."

#### No link – China’s nuclear policy is not reactive to US posture.

**Lewis, 2009** (Jeffrey, Occasional Paper No. 15 Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies, April cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf)

Jeffrey Lewis April 2009 Fundamental changes are more likely to result from ongoing changes in China’s **domestic** politics, **rather than** as a mechanistic response to changes in U.S. strategic capabilities such as missile defense or conventional strike. China’s small cadre of scientists and engineers continue to play a signifi cant role in matters relating to nuclear policy—but today, unlike in Nie’s era, they are no longer the only voices on nuclear policy. As part of an effort to ensure that military priorities are better reflected in defense science and technology investment, the General Armaments Department replaced the Commission on Science and Technology for National Defense, which was run by Nie’s son-in-law as late as the mid-1990s. Although the GAD itself may be a distinct interest group, relative to the Second Artillery or the Navy, it is presumably much less independent than in Nie’s day. Moreover, the Second Artillery and the Navy are vastly more professional today than even ten years ago. In the past it would have been diffi cult to imagine the parochial service interests overriding a desire for central control over China’s nuclear forces—as embodied in aphorisms such as “the party must control the gun, the gun must never control the party.” But today China is very different: the PLA is far more professional than ever before, and China’s leaders were **children** when the **U**nited **S**tates subjected China to **nuclear threats**.

#### No impact – modernization is not at the expense of the US-China security relationship.

**Alagappa 2009** (Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Spring 2009, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia By Muthiah Alagappa,” Global Asia 4.1, globalasia.org/articles/issue9/iss9\_17.html)

Among the major powers, nuclear weapons have created apprehensions but not fundamentally altered the basis and nature of their security interaction, which is characterized by cooperation and conflict. The vastly superior American nuclear arsenal and especially Washington’s emphasis on offensive and defensive strategies have raised concerns in Beijing and Moscow. Talk of U.S. nuclear primacy with a disarming capability created disquiet in these countries. The United States clarified that its offensive and defensive strategies are specifically directed at rogue states, and there is increasing doubt that the United States could develop effective strategic defense capabilities against China and Russia. Nevertheless, these countries can be expected to strengthen their strategic deterrent forces and increase their policy options in relation to the United States. At the same time, China has not abandoned its minimum deterrence strategy to engage in direct nuclear competition with the **U**nited **S**tates. The Chinese response has been deliberately indirect and muted. By retaining a posture of dynamic minimum deterrence and an NFU policy while continuing to modernize its nuclear force, China seeks to **prevent deterioration of its security interaction** with the **U**nited **S**tates. In the case of Russia, its strong opposition to the U.S. ballistic missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe and its suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty further strained U.S.-Russia relations. However, Russia has not articulated a nuclear strategy to directly challenge or compete with the United States. The United States also does not appear to have altered its view of not treating Russia as an enemy state.

#### Modernization is too expensive

Chicago Tribune December 2008 “Pakistan-India war is one neither can afford” http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-12-06/news/0812050415\_1\_india-and-pakistan-ved-marwah-new-delhi

Hostility between India and Pakistan is at its worst in years, but tensions stemming from last week's terror attacks in Mumbai are unlikely to bloom into full-blown war between the nuclear-armed rivals -- at least for now, according to analysts on both sides of the border. Indian authorities say that the gunmen whose rampage killed 171 people in Mumbai were trained and guided by the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. New Delhi has demanded that Islamabad turn over leaders of Lashkar and has refused to rule out military action, warning that it had the right to protect its territory "with all the means at our disposal." But a combination of new political and economic realities, U.S. pressure and perhaps some lessons learned in the past have inhibited a rush to open conflict. Any war would be financially devastating, especially at a time of worldwide recession. India's economic juggernaut has lost some steam. And even more dire, Pakistan has had to appeal to the International Monetary Fund to keep its economy afloat. Foreign investment in both countries, which fled during the 2001-02 standoff, would vanish once again in the event of an armed clash. "No one can afford it," said Abhay Matkar, a former Indian army major in Mumbai. "Both countries are not ready for war, and it will not happen." Tammy Haq, a popular talk show host in Pakistan. "We've had decades of propaganda about how strong we are, but we can't win a war," Haq said. "We have an army that's fat, not a well-oiled fighting machine." Another factor leading to the relatively restrained response may be the lessons learned from a somewhat similar attack in 2001, an incident that some say almost led both countries to do the unthinkable and press the nuclear button.

**India won’t model US policy – pursue an independent model of international relations with nuclear weapons policy**.

Amit Gupta is also a Senior Research Fellow for U.S. Studies at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. 2006 Partnering the United States: India’s Window of Opportunity Security Research Review http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/Volume14/gupta.html

Indian perceptions of international relations have remained fairly consistent since the times of Jawaharlal Nehru although the ability to achieve these ambitions has varied due to the lack of resources or power capabilities. In fact, India has pursued a different model of international relations in that it is not interested in competing to be the first of second power in the international system. Instead, Nehru’s model of Indian foreign policy rested on the assumption that India was a reformist state. Typically, the international system is viewed as being divided between status quo and revolutionary states. Status quo states are those that seek to maintain the structure of the international system and the order that ensues from it. Revolutionary states seek to partially or completely dismantle the international structure and the order that goes with it. Revolutionary states have, in recent years, been described as rogue states, states of concern, and more recently, the axis of evil. India, on the other hand, is a reformist state. A reformist state is one that by and large accepts the structure and order of the international system but wishes to make incremental changes to it in order to improve its own power potential and status within the international system. Nehru envisaged such a position for India when he suggested that while India was a poor country it was a great country that had a pivotal role to play in world affairs. This role was to try and achieve the needs of world peace and freedom that were not only part of the post-colonial revolution occurring in the post-second World War world but also critical to India’s internal development and national security objectives. [i] As a reformist state, India has sought to participate in maintaining the status quo in the international system while incrementally reshaping it so that New Delhi gets a greater say in world affairs. Thus India has been a consistent supporter of the United Nations and participated in over fifty peacekeeping operations. But India’s long-term objective is to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. India has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but at the official level has refused to assist in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry or its associated delivery systems.[ii] Similarly India has joined the Antarctic Club and is a Pioneer member of the Law of the Seas treaty thus signaling its commitment to international law yet ensuring that it would influence decision making in both bodies. Nearly six decades after independence, Nehru’s views on international affairs remain relevant. Optimally, the use of force requires multilateral force structures and the legitimacy bestowed by multilateral institutions. Further, in a globalized world where economic disparities are not only rising but are increasingly visible and therefore greater sources of tension, a commitment to global development becomes all the more pressing.

#### No indo pak war- Interdependence

Mamoon and Murshed 2010 (Dawood Mamoon, and Mansoob Murshed, Economics of Governance, 2010, Vol. 11 Issue 2, p145-167, 23p, Political Science Complete)

Conflict between India and Pakistan, which spans over most of last 60 years since their independence from British rule, has significantly hampered bilateral trade between the two nations. However, we also find that the converse is also true; more trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict and any measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable confidence building measure. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) has a high potential for the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan on a long-term basis. Pakistan and India’s general degree of openness to world (and not bilateral) trade is, however, the dominant economic factor in conflict resolution. It would be interesting to see whether India and Pakistan will be able sustain their recent impressive growth, and consequently continue with peace talks confirming the liberal peace arguments. In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy between pairs of nation should reduce inter-state hostility according to the democratic peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the sole prerogative of democracies; they can also be made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic out of economic self- interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions on many disputed issues with India. Our findings, however, veer towards the liberal peace hypothesis. Economic progress and poverty reduction combined with greater openness to international trade in general are more significant drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, rather than the independent contribution of a common democratic polity. So it is more economic interdependence rather than politics which is likely to contribute towards peaceful relations between India and Pakistan in the near future. In many ways, our results for an individual dyad echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, where it is argued that democracies cooperate not because they have common political systems, but because their economies are intricately and intensively interdependent. As pointed by Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of economic development that the contribution of common democratic values to peace becomes more salient. Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where poverty is acute and endemic, even in ostensible democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it may be that democracy itself is an endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, as suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960). Then and only then, will nations be able to fully appreciate Angell-Lanes’ (1910) arguments regarding the futility of inter-state conflict.

# 2NC

# Topicality

### 2NC Limits DA

#### Our interpretation is the only limit on hostilities definitions- otherwise broad definitions of hostilities cause limits explosion- their interps are based on political pressures to expand the WPA

Mataconis 2011 [Doug Mataconis June 15, 2011 “President Obama To Congress: War Powers Act Doesn’t Apply To Libya” http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/president-obama-to-congress-war-powers-act-doesnt-apply-to-libya/]

The question then is whether United States military forces are still involved in “hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” There seems to be no real contention by anyone that American forces, or NATO forces for that matter, are actually on Libyan territory or in Libyan territorial waters. The Administration seems to be arguing that since there are no American ground troops and no American fighter planes involved in action over Libya, then the answer to that question is no. As John Cole notes, though, we are using Predator drones to launch missiles at Libyan target on an as-needed basis, so the idea that we’re completely off the grid on this mission isn’t entirely true.¶ However, is an unmanned drone controlled from hundreds, or thousands, miles away really “engaging in hostilities” within the meaning of the War Powers Act? What about launching cruise missiles from a ship in international waters, would that be outside the purview of the WPA as well? Heck, would launching an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from a silo in North Dakota toward Tripoli be covered by the Act? The answer is unclear:¶ It remains to be seen whether majorities in Congress will accept the administration’s argument, defusing the confrontation, or whether the White House’s response will instead fuel greater criticism. Either way, because the War Powers Resolution does not include a definition of “hostilities” and the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, the legal debate is likely to be resolved politically, said Rick Pildes, a New York University law professor.¶ “There is no clear legal answer,” he said. “The president is taking a position, so the question is whether Congress accepts that position, or doesn’t accept that position and wants to insist that the operation can’t continue without affirmative authorization from Congress.”

#### Limits outweigh –

#### A. Most logical—the significance of one-of-many issues is minimal. Constraints inherently increase meaning.

#### B. It’s a precursor—education is inevitable, unfocused education isn’t productive. Limits determine the direction and productivity of learning.

#### Small schools- Huge topic with constantly developing literature magnifies resource disparities- Big programs can have a new aff every other round- No topic generics sufficient to restore balance

#### Key to fairness- essential to ensure that debates at the end of the year have meaningful clash over the mechanism

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

### 2NC History DA

#### Historical debates about hostilities support our interp

Cohen 2012 [Michael A. Cohen is a regular columnist for Foreign Policy's Election 2012 Channel and a fellow at the Century Foundation March 28, 2012 Foreign Policy “Power Grab” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/power\_grab]

It might seem like a bit of ancient history now, but one of the more creative arguments to come out of the U.S. military intervention in Libya was the Obama administration's assertion that the war did not actually represent "hostilities." Indeed, according to the president's argument to Congress, U.S. operations in Libya "do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops" -- thus making them something less than war. On the surface this appears patently absurd. The United States was flying planes over Libyan air space and dropping bombs. Missiles were being fired from off-shore. An American military officer (Adm. James Stavridis) commanded the NATO effort. There were reports of forward air controllers on the ground spotting targets for U.S. bombers. In all, NATO planes flew more than 26,000 sorties in Libya, nearly 10,000 of which were strike missions. By what possible definition is this not considered "hostilities"?¶ As it turns out the ambiguity over whether the war represented "hostilities" is one codified in U.S. law -- namely the War Powers Resolution (WPR). Under the provisions of the WPR the President was required to notify Congress within 48 hours of the beginning of U.S. military involvement. He then had 60 days to receive authorization from Congress and if he failed to do he would have 30 days to end the fighting. (Of course, if U.S. military actions do not rise to the level of "hostilities," then the president does not have to go through this rigmarole and receive congressional approval.)¶ Now on the surface, such an elastic view of what the word hostilities means is hardly unusual. Indeed, it is rather par for the course in discussions of the War Powers Resolution. In 1975, the Ford administration claimed that "hostilities" only refers to a scenario in which U.S. forces are "actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units." Similar efforts at defining down hostilities were attempted by the Carter, Reagan, and Clinton administrations when they sought to use military force. Still, these generally were in reference to peacekeeping missions like in Lebanon and Bosnia -- not offensive operations like those waged in Libya.

#### Historical interps should be preferred in this context (This Card is also in the A2: Common Sense Defs Section of the File)

Harvard Law Review, 2012 [“RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION: Separation of Powers - War Powers Resolution – Obama Administration Argues that U.S. Military Action in Libya Does Not Constitute "Hostilities."”, April, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1546]

[\*1550] Although Koh's definition of "hostilities" strains the term's everyday meaning, 36 the vehemence of commentators' responses belies the issue's complexity. Legislative history 37 and four decades of the WPR's operation indicate that not every military engagement triggers the Resolution's sixty-day clock. As courts have largely dismissed WPR litigation on prudential grounds, 38 historical practice has become law in the Resolution's regard, guiding its application. 39 Koh properly sought to locate Libya amidst the universe of WPR precedents, 40 but his analysis illustrates the indeterminacy inherent in a statutory structure with only contested, historical practice to fill textual silence. This ambiguity has weakened the WPR's ability to function as a general, ex ante time limit on executive action. Rather, Congress must actively participate in enforcing the Resolution's letter if it wishes to deny the executive the flexibility on which Koh's argument relied.

#### Broad interps of hostilities come from a House Committee report- that report includes almost anything

Litwak 2012 [Brian J. Litwak 2012¶ “Putting Constitutional Teeth Into a Paper Tiger:¶ How to Fix the War Powers Resolution” American University National Security Law Brief¶ Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 2 http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=nslb]

Currently, the WPR contains no manageable standards for a court (or the public) to determine ¶ when the President must obtain congressional approval prior to deploying armed forces abroad.¶ 86¶ ¶ Courts have acknowledged, at the very least, a potential willingness to adjudicate disputes between ¶ the political branches in the WPR context.¶ 87¶ However, without clear, simple standards to apply, ¶ courts will continue to be sidelined by the limits of their institutional capacity to handle political ¶ questions. To rectify this, Congress could make minimal alterations to the WPR. First, a definition ¶ of “hostilities” is necessary. As articulated in the House Committee report, the word “hostilities” ¶ was substituted for “armed conflict” to broaden the scope of the WPR.¶ 88¶ The report continued:¶ [I]n addition to a situation in which fighting has actually begun, hostilities also encompasses ¶ a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and ¶ present danger of armed conflict. Imminent hostilities denotes a situation in which there is a ¶ clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.¶ 89

### 2NC Reasonability

#### Reasonability begs the question of which interpretation is more correct - if we win a link to precision or limits it outweighs

#### It’s subjective—the difference is impossible to quantify—debate should emphasize 2 competing claims—that encourages debate—best for education.

#### Judge intervention may be inevitable – but offense/defense is key to prevent the worst and most arbitrary form

#### Explodes limits—dozens of exceptions to our interpretation can be made to explode the topic.

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

# Primacy DA

### Turns case

#### Primacy solves prolif better than approaches through the NPT

Baker **Spring** Ten Principles for Combating Nuclear Proliferation Heritage Lecture #783 April 10, **2003** http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/893776/posts

The offensive forces should be designed to hold at risk, and if need be destroy, the targets necessary to launch a nuclear attack. This is why the Bush Administration's policies of military transformation, preemptive actions, preventive war, and even regime change are important contributions to post-Cold War security policy. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, defensive forces should be designed to intercept the means for delivering nuclear weapons. This does not mean, however, that there is no role for civil defense. Civil defense measures are necessary, but we must recognize that any attack with a nuclear weapon will result in catastrophic damage to the U.S. or any allies that are subject to that kind of attack. It is worth noting that the Nuclear Posture Review already moves U.S. defense policy in this direction. The adoption of a damage limitation strategy also implies both different and more stringent standards for U.S. military capabilities. During the Cold War, U.S. military capabilities were organized around maintaining a survivable military force sufficient to impose unacceptable damage on things of value to the Soviet leadership. Today, the U.S. should seek to maintain the military capabilities necessary to destroy the means of attack on the U.S. and its allies and mitigate any losses that would otherwise be imposed on either. This is a more stringent standard both because it requires bringing military force to bear at earlier junctures in crises, on shorter timelines, and with more accuracy than in the past and because it seeks to ensure that things of value to the U.S. and its allies will survive an attack. The people of the United States are no longer willing to accept the notion that the destruction of a significant portion of their society should merely serve as a justification for retaliation, and the same is true for America's allies. It is this shift in demands on the military that may be the single most important source of friction in U.S.-South Korean relations. South Koreans likely want a national security policy that gives them reasonable assurance that they will not lose much of what they have gained over the past four decades. Perhaps the most profound impact of a damage limitation strategy is on the concept of military transformation. This is because such a strategy may provide guidance for military transformation. Specifically, the need to meet the requirements for damage limitation can lead to a list of tangible goals for transformation. Limiting damage from certain kinds of attacks is all but certain to require incorporating new technologies into the military and better organizing the military to exploit those technologies. 3. A modern, capable U.S. nuclear force discourages proliferation; it does not provide a role model for it. Some, and most particularly those in favor of abolishing nuclear weapons, argue that the proper answer to the proliferation problem is for the U.S. to set a good example by putting itself irreversibly on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. Some proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) saw it as the vehicle for setting this example. Entry into force of the CTBT, however, certainly would not bring additional pressure against proliferating states because it would only bar them from testing weapons they are already prohibited from possessing under the NPT. In reality, an atrophying U.S. nuclear force is likely both to encourage proliferation by states like North Korea because they will view it as a source of U.S. weakness and to result in more serious consideration of the nuclear option by countries like Japan because they will be less certain of U.S. security commitments.

#### Primacy actually deters arms racing- ensures high barriers to entry

Kim **Holmes** is vice president of foreign- and defense-policy studies at the Heritage Foundation. August 7, **2009** Defense games and arms races: not what you think Heritage Foudation http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed080709c.cfm

But Mr. Gates and Mr. Obama misunderstand the real-world dynamics of U.S. military superiority. America's military strength and determination to excel more often than not have discouraged aggression and - in cases like Libya - actually encouraged disarmament. Moreover, other countries don't always mirror our restraint. In fact, seeing the military gap closing can entice them to work harder to catch up, and this could happen faster than Mr. Gates imagines.¶ A recent nuclear arms race "game" conducted by my colleague, Baker Spring, shows how simplistic arms race ideas can be wrong.¶ Mr. Spring, a research fellow in national security policy at the Heritage Foundation, brought together experts to simulate real world reactions by nuclear powers to various crises and arms control proposals. In most cases, instead of responding in kind to U.S. unilateral acts of restraint, a majority of states, including Russia, maximized their nuclear forces to the extent their resources permitted. Three of the seven put their nuclear forces on alert in response to the U.S. "de-alerting" its forces. This so alarmed our allies, who feared we were backing off their defense, that they began taking defense measures on their own that escalated the crisis.¶ Even worse, when the U.S. tried to reassure other nuclear powers by making our nuclear command-and-control activities more transparent, four countries did the opposite, "shrouding" their plans and decisions.¶ Odd behavior? Not really: Some countries see nuclear weapons as instruments to achieve advantage over others. They aren't nuclear powers simply because we are, and their behavior is dictated not by fear of us, but rather by a desire to achieve some gain over an adversary. Saddam Hussein bluffed about his nuclear weapons program because he wanted to deter Iran, not us.¶ Unilateral restraint does not always produce the desired response from others. It can backfire and embolden other powers to take advantage of a perceived opening. When other nuclear powers think the U.S. is serious and capable of defense and retaliation, they are far more likely to behave responsibly and in a stabilizing fashion. America's nuclear superiority is not a provocation, as some think, but a deterrent to aggression.¶ The same is true with respect to America's conventional military superiority. In the real world, the wider the gap over potential adversaries, the less incentive they have to try to catch up. Our superiority is a form of deterrence; it deters enemies not only from challenging us on the battlefield, but from having much hope of ever catching up with the quality and quantity of our weapons systems. We saw this with the Soviet Union in light of President Reagan's defense spending boost.¶ Conversely, were the superiority gap to shrink and catching up appear to be more attainable, our adversaries would likely accelerate their weapons programs. Allowing our superiority to wane gives an incentive for others to build weapons - providing an impetus for an arms race.

#### Even if we cause a conflict with China- primacy is key to contain it

Keir A. **Lieber**, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. **Press**, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania July August **2007** “Superiority Complex” The Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200707/china-nukes

The previous period of American nuclear primacy—the 1950s and early 1960s—illustrates some of the strategic implications of such preeminence. The United States was able to force the Soviet Union to concede during a series of crises over Berlin from 1958 to 1961. At the peak of the 1961 Berlin crisis, President Kennedy carefully explored launching a surprise nuclear attack to disarm Soviet forces. Soviet leaders, although unaware of these deliberations, knew that any escalation was a losing proposition for them, and they backed down. Also telling is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The U.S. strategic nuclear advantage helps explain why the Soviet Union sought to place missiles in Cuba in the first place: The Soviets had very few missiles that were capable of reaching American cities. But U.S. nuclear primacy—albeit eroding by 1962—also contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles, because Khrushchev believed the United States was prepared to launch a major war, including massive nuclear strikes, against the Soviet Union.

### A2: Conventional Primacy

#### Nuclear weapons are key- conventional weapons cannot solve

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

A second criticism is that retaining (or improving) specific US nuclear ¶ weapons for the counterforce mission is unnecessary. The idea is that ¶ modern delivery systems are now so accurate that even conventional ¶ weapons can reliably destroy hardened targets. The key, according to ¶ this argument, is simply knowing the location of the target: if you know ¶ where it is, you can kill it with conventional weapons; if you do not, ¶ even nuclear weapons will not help. The implication is that even though ¶ counterforce capabilities are crucial, nuclear weapons are not needed for ¶ this mission.¶ This criticism is wrong, because there is a substantial difference between ¶ the expected effectiveness of conventional strikes and the expected effectiveness of nuclear strikes against a range of plausible counterforce ¶ targets. Even the most powerful conventional weapons—for example, ¶ the GBU-57 “Massive Ordnance Penetrator”—have an explosive power ¶ comparable to “only” 3–5 tons of TNT. By comparison, the leastpowerful (according to open sources) nuclear weapon in the US arsenal ¶ explodes with the equivalent power of roughly 300 tons of TNT.¶ 10¶ The ¶ higher yield of nuclear weapons translates to greater destructive radius ¶ and higher likelihood of target destruction.¶ 11¶ Against ordinary targets, ¶ the accuracy and destructive power of conventional weapons is sufficient. Against nuclear targets—if success is defined by the ability to ¶ destroy every weapon targeted—the much greater destructive radius of ¶ nuclear weapons provides a critical margin of error. ¶ Furthermore, in real-world circumstances delivery systems may not ¶ achieve their usual levels of accuracy. Jammers that degrade the effectiveness of guidance systems and active defenses that impede aircraft crews or ¶ deflect incoming missiles can undermine accuracy. Even mundane things like bad weather can degrade wartime accuracy. Against hardened targets, conventional weapons must score a direct hit, whereas close is good ¶ enough when it comes to nuclear weapons. Lastly, many key counterforce targets are mobile. In those cases, nuclear weapons allow for greater ¶ “target location uncertainty” (when the target has moved since being observed) compared to their conventional counterparts.¶ 12¶ It is true that modern guidance systems have given conventional weapons ¶ far greater counterforce capabilities than ever before, but there is still a ¶ sizable gap between what nuclear and conventional weapons can accomplish.

#### Nukes are key to hitting mobile targets

Keir A. Lieber, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania “Lieber and Press Reply” Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr 2010, Vol. 89, Issue 2 EBSCO

Our critics further suggest that the existence of mobile missiles obviates our analysis. If the launchers can be located, the argument goes, conventional weapons are sufficient to destroy them; if the launchers cannot be found, even nuclear weapons are useless. But the greatest challenge of targeting mobile missiles is not locating them momentarily; it is continuously tracking them and identifying where they have stopped. Hitting mobile launchers with conventional weapons requires near-perfect real-time intelligence--locating them within a few dozen yards. Even low-yield nuclear warheads would significantly reduce the targeting problem; locating the launchers within about half a mile would suffice if a five-kiloton warhead were used.

#### Hard and deeply buried bunkers- our opponents are digging deeper

Dr. Keith B. Payne is president of the National Institute for Public Policy, a nonprofit research center

he cofounded in 1981. He serves as a full professor and department head at the Graduate Department of

Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University Strategic Studies Quarterly Spring 2009 “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance”

Rogues and potential opponents are expending considerable effort on hard and deeply buried bunkers. Some of these bunkers reportedly can be held at risk of destruction only via nuclear weapons.33 During the 1991 Gulf War, some Iraqi bunkers were “virtually invulnerable to conventional weapons.”34 In 1999, concerted NATO air attacks reportedly could not destroy a deep tunnel complex at the Pristina Airport in Kosovo. As a British inspector on the ground at the time reported, “On June 11, hours after NATO halted its bombing and just before the Serb military began withdrawing, 11 Mig-21 fighters emerged from the tunnels and took off for Yugoslavia.”35 Similarly, in 1996, senior Clinton administration officials observed that only nuclear weapons could threaten to destroy the suspected Libyan chemical weapons facility located inside a mountain near Tarhunah.36 Moreover, the US Cold War “legacy” nuclear arsenal apparently has limitations against some protected targets. “Furthermore, the current [nuclear] inventory only has a limited capability for holding hardened underground facilities at risk. The country’s only nuclear earth penetrating weapons . . . cannot survive delivery into certain types of terrain in which such facilities may be located.”37 Adversaries unsurprisingly seek to protect what they value. And, as Defense Secretary Harold Brown emphasized, US deterrence threats should be capable of holding at risk those assets valued by the opponent.38 Consequently, to the extent that we hope to apply the “logic of deterrence” to rogue-state decision makers, the US capability to threaten that which they value located within protected bunkers may be important for deterrence; if North Korean and other rogue leaders demonstrate the value they attribute to assets via buried and hardened bunkers, the US capability to hold those types of targets at obvious risk of destruction may be an important deterrent threat to those leaderships. Highlighting the potential value of nuclear capabilities to do so hardly connotes a rejection of deterrence in favor of “war fighting” as often is claimed; to the contrary, it reflects an attempt to find plausible deterrence tools suited to contemporary opponents and conditions. This is precisely the point made with regard to deterring the Soviet leadership in 1989 by R. James Woolsey, who subsequently served as the director of central intelligence in the Clinton administration: Successful deterrence requires being able to hold at risk those things that the Soviet leadership most values. The nature of the Soviet state suggests that the Soviet leaders most value themselves. This emphasizes the importance of being able to hold at risk deep underground facilities, such as those at Sharapovo, which can only be done effectively by an earth-penetrating [nuclear] weapon.39

#### Conventional allows a fait accompli strategy

Robert S. **Ross** is Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University “Navigating the Tiawan Strait: Deterrance, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations” International Security 27.2 (**2002**) 48-85

Conventional deterrence by a stronger and credible power can fail when the weaker state relies on an asymmetric strategy to inflict high costs on a superior adversary. In the context of asymmetric interests, China may believe that such a strategy could compel the United States to concede rather than engage in a costly war over Taiwan. Deterrence can also fail when the deterrer's military strategy cannot eliminate the challenger's option of a fait accompli strike that achieves the challenger's limited objectives and leaves war initiation or escalation to the deterrer. In the Taiwan Strait, failed conventional deterrence could entail China starting a war to seek the rapid political capitulation of Taiwan. Thus, effective deterrence requires the United States to possess the specific capabilites necessary to frustrate a fait accompli strategy. 15

#### Inherently credible- kept the peace in Europe

Kier **Lieber** Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. **and** Daryl **Press** is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Coordinator of the War and Peace Studies Program at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding The Nukes We Need Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Nov/Dec **2009**, Vol. 88, Issue 6 EBSCO

THE SUCCESS of nuclear deterrence may turn out to be its own undoing. Nuclear weapons helped keep the peace in Europe throughout the Cold War, preventing the bitter dispute from engulfing the continent in another catastrophic conflict. But after nearly 65 years without a major war or a nuclear attack, many prominent statesmen, scholars, and analysts have begun to take deterrence for granted. They are now calling for a major drawdown of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and a new commitment to pursue a world without these weapons. Unfortunately, deterrence in the twenty-first century may be far more difficult for the United States than it was in the past, and having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with the new challenges will be crucial. The United States leads a global network of alliances, a position that commits Washington to protecting countries all over the world. Many of its potential adversaries have acquired, or appear to be seeking, nuclear weapons. Unless the world's major disputes are resolved--for example, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and around the Persian Gulf--or the U.S. military pulls back from these regions, the United States will sooner or later find itself embroiled in conventional wars with nuclear-armed adversaries.

### Sufficient Weapons

#### Nuclear primacy now- insiders confirm

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

Some critics argue that the United States is not seeking strategic primacy. They reject any intent behind the emergence of US nuclear primacy and downplay the effort to neutralize adversary deterrent forces in ¶ US military strategy. Instead of the United States bolstering its counterforce capabilities, critics emphasize how it is minimizing the role of nuclear ¶ weapons in national security strategy—as only this is consistent with ¶ international arms control and nonproliferation efforts aimed at convincing other states to forego strategic weapons, reduce existing arsenals, ¶ or cancel modernization programs. The implication is that we have mistakenly imputed sinister motives to US defense programs and planning.¶ Disavowal of the US pursuit of strategic primacy comes most frequently from those who work inside or outside the government on arms ¶ control and nonproliferation policy. Yet, those who work on US regional ¶ war plans and counterproliferation policy typically see nothing controversial in our claim that the United States seeks the ability to neutralize ¶ adversary strategic weapons. In fact, this effort appears to be official US ¶ policy. As a simple Internet search shows, the US government does not ¶ hide the wide range of research and planning efforts underway that fall ¶ under the rubric of “defeat WMD” or “combatting WMD.” And the ¶ underlying logic behind those efforts is simple: deterrence may fail, especially during conventional wars, and therefore the United States needs ¶ the ability to defend US forces, allies, and the US homeland from enemy ¶ WMD using, depending on the circumstances, conventional strikes, ¶ missile defenses, special operations, offensive cyber attacks, and in extreme cases nuclear strikes. In short, “defeating WMD” and “seeking ¶ strategic primacy” are essentially synonymous: protecting oneself from ¶ others’ strategic weapons (which sounds reasonable) and neutralizing ¶ others’ strategic deterrent forces (which sounds more malicious) are ¶ simply two phrases describing the same behavior.

#### Even though we have had cuts the trend has kept our strategic arsenal strong

Huessy 2013 [Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland , a defense and national security consulting firm February 13, 2013 “Nuclear Deterrence: The Search for Nuclear Stability or Nuclear Primacy?” http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/nuclear-deterrence-the-search-for-nuclear-stability-or-nuclear-primacy]

There is a grave danger in trying to support deterrence "on the cheap" or "casually". The 67 years of the nuclear age included one key trend--the number of US nuclear SNDVs went up as a percentage of our adversaries warheads as we moved toward lower levels of weapons starting with the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) treaty and the START I treaty under Presidents Reagan and Bush.¶ This was continued under the Moscow Treaty, and under New Start that trend was held steady. If the new proposals now being discussed materialize, especially where a significant number of Minuteman missiles are eliminated, we will have begun to abandon the thirty plus year search for greater strategic stability. Under one proposed scenario, we will have cut in half the ratio of US platforms to Russian warheads. Put differently, for every US submarine, ICBM and bomber, the Russians would have seven strategic deployed warheads, compared to three today. Other proposals such as that put forward by Global Zero, are even worse, with 10 US targets compared to 950 Russian warheads, a 95 to 1 ratio.¶ In conclusion, in our pursuit of lower levels of nuclear weapons, we should not heighten instability to such an extent that we make the use of nuclear weapons more likely in a crisis, or because the strategic environment has become imbalanced, heighten the chances that reckless behavior on the part of a nuclear armed power becomes more rather than less likely.

#### Nuclear primacy is key to coercive leverage in conflicts to prevent them from escalating

Keir A. **Lieber**, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. **Press**, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania Correspondence The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? International Security 31.3 (**2007**) 174-193

We ended our article with a call for new research on the utility of nuclear primacy.21 Lantis, however, believes that the answer is already clear. He asserts that U.S. nuclear primacy is worth very little because it yields almost no coercive leverage. Lantis lists several instances in which other countries refused to accede to U.S. preferences despite U.S. nuclear primacy. But his conclusion that primacy produces little benefit is premature.22 One reason to expect that nuclear primacy will yield coercive leverage in future crises—particularly those involving high stakes for the United States—is that the prior era of U.S. nuclear primacy gave Washington substantial bargaining leverage over the Soviet Union. For example, U.S. leaders, reassured by the favorable balance of power, forced Nikita Khrushchev to back down repeatedly during a series of crises over Berlin from 1958 to 1961. In 1962 the Soviets were successfully coerced again—this time to remove their missiles from Cuba in humiliating fashion. Indeed, Soviet accounts of the crisis suggest that it was their desire to escape from U.S. nuclear primacy—and the leverage it had given the United States—that drove them to send Soviet missiles to Cuba in the first place.23 The United States may gain coercive leverage from nuclear primacy in future crises as well. If the United States intervened militarily in a war between China and Taiwan, U.S. officials might privately caution Chinese leaders against alerting their strategic nuclear forces—warning that any steps to do so could trigger an immediate disarming strike. The purpose of such a threat would be to keep the Chinese nuclear arsenal out of the conflict, allowing the United States to defend Taiwan conventionally. A U.S. strategy [End Page 192] along these lines would entail great risks, similar in some ways to the risks accepted by the United States during the Cuban missile crisis. But in the future, if U.S. leaders feel that defending Taiwan is a key element in containing China, intervening in the war and issuing nuclear threats may seem as sensible as Kennedy's hard-line stance seemed to U.S. leaders in 1962. Finally, U.S. nuclear primacy may benefit the United States more directly. America's most likely future adversaries may have nuclear weapons.24 In a war between the United States and North Korea, for example, both Washington and Pyongyang might be tempted to issue coercive nuclear threats. In the context of ongoing conventional combat and nuclear threats, fleeting intelligence about the location of North Korean nuclear forces, or signs that North Korea was readying its nuclear forces, would compel the United States to consider launching a counterforce strike. Using nuclear weapons would greatly increase the odds of success.

### A2: Counterforce Causes Crises

#### Benefits to primacy outweigh the costs

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A second criticism of the argument for retaining and improving certain counterforce capabilities is that the cure could be worse than the disease. Counterforce capabilities may mitigate escalation during a conflict--for example, by dissuading adversaries from nuclear saber rattling, by reassuring allies that the United States can defend them, and, if necessary, by giving the United States the ability to pursue regime change if adversaries brandish or use nuclear weapons. But they may also exacerbate the problem of controlling escalation if an adversary feels so threatened that it adopts a hair-trigger nuclear doctrine. Specifically, the United States' ability to launch a disarming strike without killing millions of civilians might increase the escalatory pressures that already exist because of the nature of the U.S. military's standard wartime strategy. Conventional air strikes on radar systems, communication links, and leadership bunkers may look even more like the precursors of a preemptive disarming strike if adversaries know that the United States possesses a well-honed nuclear counter-force capability. This second criticism has merit. Nevertheless, the benefits of maintaining effective counterforce capabilities trump the costs. Strong counterforce capabilities should make adversaries expect that escalating a conventional war will lead to a disarming attack, not a cease-fire. Beyond deterrence, these capabilities will provide a more humane means of protecting allies who are threatened by nuclear attack and give U.S. leaders the ability to pursue regime change if an adversary acts in a truly egregious fashion. Moreover, some danger of escalation is unavoidable because the style of U.S. conventional operations will inevitably blind, rattle, and confuse U.S. adversaries. If the United States has powerful counterforce tools, these may dissuade its enemies from escalating in desperate times, and U.S. leaders would have a much more acceptable option if deterrence fails.

# 1NR

### A2 Aff Solves--- Trade

#### Framing: Prolif is fundamentally inevitable--- where there’s a will there’s a way--- Their author concedes stopping nuclear trade is insufficient

**1AC AUTHOR/ARTICLE** **Albright et al. 7/29** (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental [Institute for Science and International Security](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Science_and_International_Security" \t "_blank" \o "Institute for Science and International Security) (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of [atomic weapons](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_weapons" \t "_blank" \o "Atomic weapons). Albright holds a [Master of Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Science" \t "_blank" \o "Master of Science) in [physics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics" \t "_blank" \o "Physics) from [Indiana University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_University" \t "_blank" \o "Indiana University) and a M.Sc. in[mathematics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics" \t "_blank" \o "Mathematics) from [Wright State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wright_State_University" \t "_blank" \o "Wright State University). He has taught physics at [George Mason University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Mason_University" \t "_blank" \o "George Mason University) in [Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia" \t "_blank" \o "Virginia).  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, [http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full%20Report\_DTRA-PASCC\_29July2013-FINAL.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full%20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf" \t "_blank))

In parallel to these efforts, the United States and its allies must maintain and reenergize their

commitment to ending those security problems in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia

that can contribute to nuclear proliferation. The countermeasures set forth in this report can slow

down or thwart almost any nuclear program and also expose secret nuclear programs to the

international community. The combination of slowing down and exposing programs is a powerful

contribution to stopping nuclear proliferation and limiting the development of nuclear arsenals.

But in the end, a state determined to obtain nuclear weapons can make progress, albeit more

slowly, despite these methods. Thus, these countermeasures work best when pursued in parallel to

efforts based on addressing security concerns where appropriate, changing cost-benefit analyses,

#### Indigenous capabilities make prolif inevitable--- they’re coming online now

**1AC AUTHOR/ARTICLE** **Albright et al. 7/29** (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental [Institute for Science and International Security](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Science_and_International_Security" \t "_blank" \o "Institute for Science and International Security) (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of [atomic weapons](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_weapons" \t "_blank" \o "Atomic weapons). Albright holds a [Master of Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Science" \t "_blank" \o "Master of Science) in [physics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics" \t "_blank" \o "Physics) from [Indiana University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_University" \t "_blank" \o "Indiana University) and a M.Sc. in[mathematics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics" \t "_blank" \o "Mathematics) from [Wright State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wright_State_University" \t "_blank" \o "Wright State University). He has taught physics at [George Mason University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Mason_University" \t "_blank" \o "George Mason University) in [Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia" \t "_blank" \o "Virginia).  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, [http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full%20Report\_DTRA-PASCC\_29July2013-FINAL.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full%20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf" \t "_blank))

In the next five to ten years, declared or undeclared centrifuge programs could develop, or re-start,

in countries that are newly industrialized or in more rapidly developing countries, such as South

Korea, Turkey, and South Africa. Their centrifuges may be more advanced than those built

initially by proliferant states such as Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. These programs would be expected

to be mostly capable of making centrifuges indigenously. However, they are still expected to

depend on overseas procurement for certain items in order to save costs and time and obtain higher

quality, more reliable goods.

### NPT Fails

#### Anyway, they cannot make the NPT good enough:

#### The NPT has no enforcement mechanism- even with greater leadership

Salik 2012 [Naeem Ahmad Salik Before his retirement from Pakistan's military, Brigadier Salik served as director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, the secretariat of Pakistan's National Command Authority. He has taught at National Defense University in Islamabad and has been a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins University and the Brookings Institution. He is currently pursuing a doctorate in political science and international relations at the Center for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia 14 JUNE 2012 “A Tale of Two Treaties?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/tale-of-two-treaties#]

This is not quite correct. I do recognize, however, that the NPT lacks an organization dedicated to its effective implementation, along the lines of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization. Because the IAEA's founding predated the NPT, and because the agency's primary purpose was to support US President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program, overseeing the treaty is a task that was not originally foreseen and for which the agency is inadequately equipped.¶ Still, those who argue for strengthening the treaty's institutional support and oversight system should remember that, precisely because such structures were not part of the treaty regime as it was approved by signatories, these structures cannot easily be added now. Adding them would require an amendment to the treaty, and such an amendment would not necessarily be accepted by member states. After all, a majority of IAEA members have not ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, despite the passage of seven years.

#### Your supporters of the NPT and US leadership are epistemologically flawed

Leverett and Leverett 2012 [Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. and a professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs and Hillary Mann Leverett is a Middle East analyst and former State Department and National Security Council official. She is currently the chief executive officer of STRATEGA, a political risk consulting firm. She worked for many years in the US government on a number of Middle East issues, including as Middle East expert for the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff October 18, 2012 “U.S. Efforts to Take Away Iran’s Rights by Unilaterally Rewriting the NPT with Complicity of America’s Iran “Experts”” http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/12992]

”A colleague in D.C. once said this to me about the U.S. nonproliferation epistemic community—and by this community we both meant the entirety of the various NGOs and think tanks and the few University based centers that focus on nonproliferation studies in the U.S.: that the community is very D.C. centric, cliquish, incestuous and self-referential, to its detriment. These words have really stuck with me, because I find them to be absolutely true, and both insightful and parsimonious as I’ve observed the community over the years.¶ I would take it even further and say that in addition, in my opinion, the whole U.S. based nonproliferation experts community—with few exception—is systematically biased toward support of USG positions on all the top nonproliferation issues. They maintain an essentially common narrative and set of emphases that is in line with, and that provides support for, the narrative and emphases of the USG, with only the smallest amounts of quibbling around the edges (Albright will talk all day long about his “aluminum tubes” work). I think that there is in the work of the U.S. nonproliferation epistemic community far too little real, independent evaluation and criticism of USG positions. As I see it, the U.S. nonproliferation community almost acts as a second wave of apologists for U.S. policy, after the USG itself—though it sometimes shrouds this effort in a lot of technical and sometimes academic-looking jargon. But in the end what the U.S. nonproliferation community ABSOLUTELY DOES NOT DO is serve in the role of an independent, rigorous, analytical check on USG nonproliferation positions, as it could and should do, and as the nongovernmental nonproliferation community in other countries does. And I think there are some clear reasons for this. Much more so than in other countries, the members of the U.S. based nonproliferation community tend, with very few exceptions, to¶ 1) have been employed by the USG in the past;¶ 2) want to be employed by the USG in the future;¶ 3) be funded by or hope to be funded by the USG; and/or¶ 4) want to maintain the access and good favor they have with USG officials, for the sake of information and for the sake of invitations to cool events, etc. ¶ Basically what I’m saying is that they are biased towards the positions of the USG, because of their overly close personal and institutional associations with the USG, and because they see their own professional success as being tied to the favor of the USG.¶ I think there’s also a significant degree of media whorishness at work here as well. As a colleague once wrote to me while we were discussing this topic: ‘I think there is another—very important—aspect you may be missing that may even over-ride the ones you mention: aside from taking USG positions, the non-proliferation community likes the high-media profile allotted it, when it loudly tut-tuts 3rd world nuclear arms capacities (or enemies of the west’s nuclear arms capacities), whether or not such capacities are consistent w/ NPT and/or CSAs. People like being quoted, appearing on TV, and generally feeling important. The Non-proliferation community “loves” the attention and basks in this glow, and though they would “privately” acknowledge that Iran is not so far outside bounds (if at all), they nonetheless pass on statements and innuendo to media indicating the alleged dangers and thus wittingly or not, fan the flames. Others like ISIS simply pass on opinions dressed as expert findings. It just would not do for Non-proliferation types to tell the media: “well, no, Iran’s program is actually not a threat to world peace yet” like the DNI did.’”

#### No prolif breakout without the NPT

Wesley 2005 [Michael Wesley (Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University) September 2005 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299 “It’s time to scrap the NPT” EBSCO]

The major concern of those who oppose scrapping the NPT is that it would¶ result in a ‘proliferation break-out’. This suggests that without the constraints¶ of the NPT, the number of nuclear weapons states would rise from the current¶ nine acknowledged and non-acknowledged holders of nuclear weapons to¶ dozens. However, this assumes that the NPT has been the main reason for the¶ limited spread of nuclear weapons over the past 60 years, an unlikely¶ proposition for a regime whose shortcomings have been acknowledged since¶ its inception. A more likely explanation for the relative lack of proliferation is¶ that most states have experienced insufficient demand-side pressures to overcome the costs of acquiring nuclear arsenals. For most states, this is a condition¶ that will persist past the ending of the NPT. Even though states have grown¶ wealthier and proliferation costs have fallen, it is important to recognise that¶ developing a nuclear arsenal is not cost-free. Nuclear weapons and ballistic¶ missiles programs are expensive, meaning that most states will need to divert¶ substantial resources from their conventional armed forces or other policy¶ programs during the weapons development phase.¶ 6¶ Costs can also be incurred¶ through the international opprobrium that will likely attend proliferation, from¶ diplomatic boycotts to cancellation of aid funding to sanctions by states such as¶ Japan. And a nuclear program brings risks, both the danger of catastrophic¶ environmental and social damage from accidents, as well as arising from the¶ strategic uncertainties generated among neighbouring states (Erickson 2001:¶ 43). Potential proliferators must also confront the power of the nuclear¶ taboo\*/which long pre-dates the NPT\*/and shoulder the burden of justifying¶ to domestic and international public opinion why they need the bomb. These¶ factors will persist past the demise of the NPT, and in the absence of a sudden¶ decline in the security of a large number of states, fears of a proliferation breakout are unfounded.

### Prolif D

#### No cascade of proliferation – its historically wrong and based on alarmist predictions – China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, South Africa, Libya all pursued nuclear weapons and none caused a cascade. Prefer our evidence - their lit base is all lobbyist scaremongering

Steve Kidd (Director of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association, where he has worked since 1995 (when it was the Uranium Institute)) June 2010 “Nuclear proliferation risk – is it vastly overrated?” http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/story.asp?sc=2056931

The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them, largely claiming to have nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are castigated as being in the industry’s pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if they impose additional costs on the industry

### China Modernization

#### No modernization – 41 year timeframe, capabilities, morale, and leadership.

**Howard, 2004** (Col. Russ Howard, Head of the Department of Social Sciences, Director of the Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, MIT Security Studies Program Seminar, “The China Threat?” October 13, web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed\_archives\_04fall/howard.htm)

Col. Howard took this opportunity to provide an update of a 1999 monograph on the People's Liberation Army (PLA).1 The conclusion of his presentation (and the original monograph) was that the PLA does not represent much of a threat to the United States. The PLA has neither the inclination nor the ability to threaten the United States. Those who speak of a China threat in the short-term are **exaggerating** and inflating the China threat. Although China has developed capable missiles and aircraft, the PLA's arms are still short and its legs are still slow. After recent efforts at PLA modernization, it may be in a moderately better position compared to other regional militaries, but has not closed the gap with the U.S. military. The gap between the U.S. military and the PLA, especially in terms of technologically-advanced weaponry and ability to efficiently use these weapons, may have grown larger in recent years. In recent years, there have been four important developments related to PLA modernization. First, PLA strategists have focused on developing asymmetric capabilities and focused on tactics that the weaker power could use to defeat the stronger power. Second, the PLA has expanded its arsenal of missiles and advanced aircraft. Third, in 2003 China became the third country to successfully launch a manned spacecraft, which may have important future implications for space warfare. Fourth, with Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's re-election in 2004 and calls for revising the constitution, cross-strait relations are very tense. If China tries to become a hegemon, from a capabilities standpoint, this is more likely to be something to worry about in 2050 than in 2015. The PLA is still weak in many fundamental areas including systems integration, propulsion, and computer technology. China is dependent on Russia for most of its advanced weapons. The PLA has shown no signs of being able to indigenously produce advanced weapons. The PLA lacks power projection capability. The lack of in-flight refueling prevents the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) from projecting power. The lack of aerial escort and weak anti-air warfare (AAW) capability of surface ships prevents the PLA Navy (PLAN) from being able to project power on the sea. PLA infantry is very heavy, and when coupled with weak lift assets, severely limits the PLA's ability to transport forces to other places. The PLA has also shown very little ability to deal with a U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group. According to the Department of Defense's July 2003 report on Chinese military power, the PLA is trying to exploit existing technology to develop asymmetric tactics and develop diversified force options. However, Col. Howard argued that this report depends too much on open sources and too much on speculation. He noted that the report relies on phrases such as "is expected to," "is reported to," "could," "may", "may eventually." There is little indication in the report that the PLA has realized its goals of military modernization. Col. Howard criticized many China-watchers for talking about future PLA force structure as if the U.S. military will not build new weapons. The PLAN is still very backward. The plans to acquire eight more Kilo-class submarines from Russia will improve capabilities, but PLAN operators are still inexperienced and weak compared to modern militaries. The PLAN still does not have an aircraft carrier, and in order to have a credible fleet, the PLAN would need to have at least a few carriers. The PLAN is plagued by insufficient training time, few live-fire exercises, and very poor integration of assets. The PLAAF is also very backward. All but 150 of the PLAAF's aircraft are 1950s or 1960s technology. In 1992, China started receiving Su-27s from Russia, but they have been slow in integrating these assets and in the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Su-27s did not fly due to maintenance problems. The PLAAF has no in-flight refueling capability, suffers from insufficient training time, and like the rest of the PLA, has not been combat-tested since 1979. The PLA has insufficient lift to project power. Advancement in the PLA is still based on party loyalty rather than military accomplishments and abilities. Overall, the PLA suffers from poor morale. With its large numbers, the PLA is irresistible in defense and incapable in offense. Although China is a nuclear power, it is not a nuclear threat.

#### No link – Chinese modernization rooted in international prestige and CCP insecurity.

**Blumenthal, 2009** (Daniel, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, Congressional Documents and Publications, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing; MARITIME DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN EAST ASIA” July 15, lexis)

What drives this military build-up? It is not driven by threats to China - by any objective measure, China does not face a military threat. With the fall of the Soviet Union, China no longer must concern itself with protecting its land borders from invasion. Since the end of the Cold War the region has, by and large, been at peace. Instead, I would argue that China's military build-up is driven by domestic factors, the desire for national prestige, and the insecurity of the **C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty. China is exhibiting behavior that we would expect from a rising great power. The only surprise is that we expected them to behave differently. The American public has been told time and again by successive administrations and many experts that China's rise would differ from the rise of all other great powers in history. But this is simply not happening.

#### Won’t abandon NFU – strategic considerations.

**Zhang, 2008** (Haohui, associate Professor of political science at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, with research interests in U.S.-China relations, democratization and Hong Kong politics, Comparative Strategy, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear Policy” EBSCO)

There are also strategic considerations for China not to abandon the no-first-use policy. China certainly does not want to give additional incentives for the United States to expand its ballistic missile defense, as that could weaken Chinese nuclear deterrence. At this moment, the currently operational U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System for national defense is limited to ground-based interceptors. China should be reasonably confident that its emerging offensive capabilities, based on at least 300 securely deployed warheads, would be able to overcome this ground-based defensive system. Renouncing the no-first-use policy, however, may give incentives to the United States to pursue a space-based system that could seriously complicate China’s nuclear forces.65 Indeed, there are already a growing number of voices from the political right in the United States that only a space-based system could provide true protection for the country.66 Moreover, China does not want to give Japan incentives to develop its own nuclear weapons. At the moment, the only Chinese military advantage over Japan is its nuclear weapons. Given the rapid souring of relations between the two countries in recent years, some Chinese analysts believe that a war is not a remote possibility. The most likely causes are territorial disputes in the East China Sea and possible Japanese involvement in the Taiwan Strait.67 Renouncing the no-first-use policy could give a boost to the rising view inside Japan that it must develop its own nuclear weapons to counter the increasing threat from China and North Korea. Indeed, according to Major General Peng Guanlian, a leading PLA strategist, the nuclear momentum in Japan is approaching the threshold point.68 Thus, any major Chinese changes in its nuclear doctrine may just push Japan over the threshold. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that, due to political and strategic considerations, China will not formally renounce the no-first-use policy. However, this does not mean that China would not have incentives to use nuclear deterrence to prevent American intervention in a Taiwan Strait war. The reason is that China must do everything possible to prevent a disastrous defeat and consequent independence of Taiwan. Thus, it would be unrealistic to expect China to adhere to the no-first-use doctrine when a war in the Taiwan Strait looks real or even unavoidable, and when the emerging Chinese nuclear capability does offer a credible deterrence against American military intervention.

### Indo-Pak

#### Neither will strike first

Eric Vas (retired Lieutenant general) 2007 “Can India Avoid a Military conflict with Pakistan?” http://inpad.org/res45.html

Many urge India to stand down in order to decrease the tension between the two countries. As long as freedom remains a distant dream in Pakistan and its official media continues to preach hatred against India, our security forces must continue to remain alert. India's responses to Pakistan's current moves on the five fronts are on the right lines. India has declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but that it is prepared to give a befitting response to any Pakistani nuclear threat. India has stressed that it is prepared to discuss any issue, including J&K with Pakistan, but only when it stops its support of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile our security forces continue to intercept intruders and deal with armed terrorists within the State, while the government attempts to improve the administration and encourage dissidents to join the political system. J&K State elections are due in September. These will be fair and open elections, which may be witnessed by foreign observers in their individual capacities. Dissidents have been invited to take part in the elections to prove that they have public support. However, official Pakistani media continues its barrage of virulent anti-India propaganda. There are no visible signs that steps are being taken to stop and undo the damage being done by these tactics. Thus, to answer the question posed at the head of this article, while the Indo-Pak cold war continues, the military front is unlikely to escalate into a nuclear exchange or a full-fledged military conflict. It would be imprudent for Pakistan to do this, and it would not be cost effective for India to initiate an all out war. If cross border infiltration and terrorist attacks against innocent citizens continue the Government may order the armed forces to take appropriate action against terrorist bases within POK. The danger of an Indian raid across the LOC against a terrorist camp escalating into a major battle cannot be overruled.